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Article 5

Comment
APPELLATE REVIEW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION CASES IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
The current procedure governing appellate review of workmen's
compensation cases in Nebraska is the product of numerous and
uncoordinated legislative actions. The state's first workmen's compensation statute, enacted in 1913, provided that "report[s] of all
settlements and releases [in compensation cases] shall be filed by
the employer with the Labor Commissioner. .

. ."'

The legislature

also provided in 1913 that all contested compensation cases were
to be adjudicated by the district courts.2 This procedure for review
of compensation cases was first altered in 1917. In that year the
legislature created the office of compensation commissioner and
made it the commissioner's duty to execute the compensation
statute. 8 The commissioner's actions were appealable to the district
courts for a trial de novo.
Nebraska's compensation system was administered under the
1917 administrative agency format until 1935 when it was substantially revised. In that year the legislature, recognizing that "an
impartial and efficient administration of the Nebraska Workmen's
Compensation Law is essential to the prosperity and well-being
of this state," created the Workmen's Compensation Court under
the Judicial article of the state constitution. 4 Under the 1935 legis-

lation one judge of the compensation court was directed to first
hear and make findings and awards in contested cases; 5 these
awards were made reviewable by the compensation court en banc.6
The legislature then made the judgments of the compensation court
en banc appealable to the district courts in the form of an error
proceeding. 7 But the 1935 amendments to the compensation act
retained the previously enacted procedure for appeals from the
compensation commission by allowing a party to waive a rehearing
by the workmen's compensation court en banc and appeal directly
1 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 45 (1913).
2 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 39 (1913).
3 Neb. Laws c. 85, § 27 (1917).
4 NEB. COMP. STAT. § 48-162 (Supp. 1935).
5 NEB. COMP. STAT. § 48-174 (Supp. 1935).
6 Id.
7

Id.
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to the district courts for a hearing de novo.8 Any judgment of a
district court, whether made after a rehearing by the compensation
court en banc or not, was made appealable to the Nebraska Supreme Court.9 Substantially this same procedure is employed in
workmen's compensation cases in Nebraska today.
II. OBJECTIVES OF NEBRASKA'S COMPENSATION LAW
Workmen's compensation represents a significant departure from
the earlier procedures through which an injured employee could
redress grievances against his employer that accrued from injuries
incurred in the course of his employment. Under workmen's compensation the ordinary negligence of the employee plays no role in
the adjudication of the employee's claim for benefits provided by
the compensatiov statute. 0 Rather, the injury must be sustained
"in the course of and arising out of" the employment for recovery
to be possible under the workmen's compensation law." Before the
adoption of the compensation law, redress of a work related injury
depended upon general tort theory, i.e., upon the fault of the employer and the absence of any common law defenses. The workmen's compensation system has wholly supplanted the tort approach to the litigation of these cases.' 2
In addition to the substitution of a definite benefit in the form
of compensation for the unpredictable tort approach to redress of
an employee's claim against his employer, there was a strong
legislative policy to afford injured persons a speedy and inexpensive
procedure for the determination, review, adjustment, and payment
S Id.
9 Id.

10 Only willful negligence on the part of the employee in the per11

12

formance of his duties is relevant to the adjudication of compensation
cases. NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-101 (Supp. 1971).
The rule for determining whether one is entitled to compensation is
embodied in NEB. RE . STAT. § 48-101 (Supp. 1971), which provides:
"'When personal injury is caused to an employee by accident or occupational disease, arising out of and in the course of his or her employment, such employee shall receive compensation therefore from his
or her employer if the employee was not willfully negligent at the
time of receiving such injury."
The common law defenses were originally deleted from the law of
workmen's compensation by NEB. ComP. STAT. § 3643 (1913). NE.
REV. STAT. § 48-102 (Supp. 1971), still prevents the use of these defenses. Although the workmen's compensation system was intended
to replace traditional tort approaches to recovery, an injured employee can elect to seek recovery in tort and thereby waive his right
to recover under workmen's compensation.
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of claims for work-related injuries. 13 To this end the Nebraska
Legislature enacted specific time-periods in which the compensation
court is required to act on contested compensation cases. 14 Similarly, the district courts are required to hear and dispose of compensation cases appealed to them within fourteen days whether the
court is in term or not.15 Even the state supreme court is directed
by the compensation statute to hear and dispose of appeals involving
workmen's compensation more speedily than it must dispose of
other docketed cases. The legislature specifically provided that:
Any appeal from the judgment of the district court shall be prosecuted in accordance with the general laws of the state regulating
appeals in actions at law. Such appeal shall be perfected within
one month from the rendition of judgment by the district court, the
cause shall be advanced for argument before the Supreme Court,
and the Supreme Court shall render its judgment and write an
opinion in such cases as speedily as possible. 16
The Nebraska Supreme Court has frequently noted the nature
of the legislature's martdate and has often reiterated the objective
of the compensation system. The court has generally held that the
-compensation statute is remedial in character and that its purpose
is to do justice without expensive litigation and unnecessary delay.17
The court recognized this objective in an early case where it held
that:
[TIhe employer's liability act was intended by the legislature to
simplify legal proceedings and to bring about a speedy settlement
of disputes between the injured employee and his employer. It was
intended to take the place of the tort action with its tedious delays
and technicalities that so often clog and at times totally defeat the
administration of justice.18
The supreme court has maintained this position so rigorously that
it has affirmed the decision of a judge who heard only a portion
of the evidence at the trial on the ground that the legislature had
intended to provide for speedy adjudication of workmen's compensation claims.19 Indeed, the Nebraska court noted that "in some

17

Schesselman v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 Neb. 65, 195 N.W. 466 (1923).
REv. STAT. § 48-164 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-184 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1968).
Gill v. Hrupek, 184 Neb. 436, 439, 168 N.W.2d 377, 379 (1969).

's

Biedeck v. Acme Amusement Co., 102 Neb. 128, 131, 166 N.W. 193,

'3

14 NE.
15
16

194 (1918).
19 Western Newspaper Union v. Dee, 108 Neb. 303, 187 N.W. 919 (1922).

The trial judge whose judgment was affirmed in this case had heard
only a portion of the evidence put on at trial because the trial had
been recessed while the parties negotiated, and during the recess the
original judge had left the state.
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respects compensation cases take precedence
over other cases by
20
a specific enactment of the legislature.1
In its efforts to provide for speedy and inexpensive adjudication
of compensation claims, the Nebraska Legislature gave the Compensation Commission, the body that then exercised original jurisdiction over the claims of injured workmen under the act, wide
discretion for conducting cases and arriving at decisions. The legislature originally provided that:
The compensation commissioner shall not be bound by the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence or by any technical or
formal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided, but may
make the investigation in such manner as in his judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of Article 8, chapter 85, Revised Statutes
of Nebraska for 1913, and any act or acts amendatory thereof.21
This expression of legislative policy indicates that the courts
with original jurisdiction were not only to have wide latitude in
awarding or refusing compensation but also that appellate courts
were to modify the findings of the lower courts only where the
errors were material. This limited appellate review was to apply
with particular force where the errors of the lower courts were
factual, not legal, in nature. Had the legislature not intended to
secure the flindings of the trial courts from review by the appellate
courts, except for material errors, there would have been no reason
for granting the trial courts such wide discretion in judging compensation cases. It is clear, then, that under the original workmen's
compensation statute, Nebraska's appellate courts were to have
only limited power to review the findings of the lower courts.
III. OBSTACLES PREVENTING EFFECTIVE APPELLATE
REVIEW IN COMPENSATION CASES
The objectives of the compensation system, i.e., to provide
speedy, inexpensive and equitable procedures for processing the
20 Id. at 306, 187 N.W. at 921.
21 This articulation of the legislature's desire to have the courts sacrifice
technical precision for compliance with the objectives of the compensation system was first recorded at Neb. Laws c. 85, § 29 (b) (1917).
The language of the 1917 statute is still a part of the compensation
law except that the final line of the section now reads: "but may
make the investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of sections 48-101 to 48-190." NEB. Rav.
STAT. § 48-168 (Reissue 1968). As a matter of practice, however, the
compensation court is inclined to adhere to the formal rules of evidence though they are not bound to do so by the statutes.
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claims of injured workmen, remain substantially unfulfilled. In
many compensation cases the procedures outlined by the current
statute have proven to be tedious and cumbersome. The sluggish
nature of this process has greatly disadvantaged the injured employee who must have his case settled promptly to be able to
support his family.
Among the most overt causes of the failure of the compensation
system to meet its objectives are the increased number of cases on
the docket of the compensation court,22 the superior bargaining
position of the employer and the ready availability of expert witnesses for the employer who enjoys greater affluence than the
injured employee. Additionally, recovery of compensation is frequently delayed because insurance companies that carry compensation insurance for the employer must be consulted in the negotiation
or defense of compensation cases. Insurance companies may be
less anxious to see cases settled quickly than employers. An employer, unlike an insurance company, has an interest in having his
employee's claim settled quickly and justly so his other employees
are not disquieted by their employer's attitude toward his injured
workman.
Numerous procedural devices in Nebraska's compensation law
are designed to equalize the respective positions of the injured
employee and his employer. The legislature provided, for example,
that proceedings for compensation cannot be maintained "unless
notice of the injury shall have been given to the employer as soon
as practicable after the happening thereof . . . ."2 The Nebraska
Supreme Court construing this provision of the compensation law
has held that an employee need not give formal written notice of
an injury if the employer has actual notice thereof. 24 The judicial
interpretation of this legislative requirement has been so liberal
as to hold that even a request for medical service was sufficient to
25
satisfy this section of the statute.
The quest for speedy disposal of compensation claims can cut
against the interests of the injured workman. The Nebraska Su22

This increase is reflected in increases in both the estimated number
of workers covered per month and in the amount of compensation
paid.

23

24
25

STATIsTIcAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES,

No. 447, at 295

(1970). Statistics cataloged in the Annual Reports of the Nebraska
Workmen's Compensation Court for 1971 indicate that over the past
eleven years the number of cases filed in Nebraska has risen from
41,670 in fiscal year 1960 to 48,940 in fiscal year 1971.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-313 (Reissue 1968).
Skelly Oil Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930).
Gilbert v. Metro. Util. Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57 N.W.2d 770 (1953).
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preme Court has held on numerous occasions that a claim for
compensation is barred unless it is filed with the compensation
court within six months or unless a petition is filed within one
year of the date of 2injury.26
This rule is not applied in cases involv7
ing latent injuries.
The court has generally held that "the applicable rule of construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that it be liberally
construed to the end that its beneficient purposes may not be
thwarted by technical refinement of interpretation." 28 This rule of
liberal construction seeks to attain the objectives of the workmen's
compensation system; hence, it applies only to questions of law and
does not mitigate the plaintiff's burden of proof of facts sufficient to
support his case. 29 This apparently means that the lower courts
must comply with the objectives of the compensation act even if
the cost of attaining the goals of the system is forfeiture of the
requirement of strict compliance with the technical procedures delineated by the statute.
Despite the judicial doctrine of liberal construction of the compensation act which allows only limited review of questions of fact
and which allows injured employees to obtain compensation even
if they fail to comply with the technical procedures of the statute,
the primary objective of the system has not been satisfied. Contested compensation cases still must pass through expensive and
sluggish appeals before the injured workman can get the statutory
benefits that he seeks.3 0
26 The time periods during which a claim is required to be filed are
prescribed by NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-133 (Reissue 1968). The supreme
court has held that failure to comply with these technical provisions
of the compensation law will bar an injured workman from recovering
compensation. Walton v. Swift & Co., 125 Neb. 455, 250 N.W. 661
(1933).
27

Bame v. Lipsett, Inc., 172 Neb. 623, 111 N.W.2d 380 (1961). However,
the burden of proof of the latent nature of the injury is on the plaintiff. Ohnmacht v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 178 Neb. 741, 135 N.W.2d 237

28

Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal Co., 175 Neb. 841, 845, 124 N.W.2d
377, 380 (1963).

(1965).

29 Spangler v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 177 Neb. 740, 131 N.W.2d 159 (1964).
30

With reference to the problem of providing for speedy determination
of compensation claims in Ohio, which has a procedure that resembles
Nebraska's, it has been said that:
"[C]ases are not speedily brought to trial even though the law

specifically requires that such cases be given priority for hearings.
It is not unusual to have several thousand compensation cases,
some of which have lain dormant in the courts for as long as 5
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IV. REVIEW OF CURRENT COMPENSATION PROCEDURE
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation law requires that all
disputed claims for compensation be submitted to the Nebraska
Workmen's Compensation Court for determination.3 ' That court
is empowered to examine parties or witnesses under oath, to issue
subpoenas and to enforce its judgments.82 It is also charged with
the duty of conducting itself reasonably to carry out the intent of
3
the compensation act.8
A compensation case is heard for the first time by a single judge
of the workmen's compensation court.3 4 This one-judge court, like
the workmen's compensation court en banc, is empowered to receive and examine evidence, to make determinations and to enforce
them. 5 It is not clear from the statutes whether the legislature
wanted a record made of the original hearing before the one-judge
court; in practice, however, no record is made at the original
hearing of a compensation claim.3 6 The burden is on the claimant
to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled
to compensation, and the rule of liberal construction of the Act
applies only to questions of law and not to questions of fact.3 7
Appeals from the findings made at the conclusion of the original
hearing can be taken in either of two ways: (1) the appeal can be
taken to the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court en banc 8s
or (2) the appeal can be taken directly to the district court of the
county in which the accident occurred.3 9 In either case the claim
years, awaiting a trial. That being the case, a claimant depending
upon compensation benefits is seriously inconvenienced by the
neglect and delay to promptly hear his case. This certainly is not
the intent or spirit of the law." Keller, Recommended Changes in

Ohio Workmen's Compensation, 17 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 122, 125
(1968).

The average lag times experienced in compensation cases processed

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39

through Nebraska's compensation system are delineated in the Appendix. The chart set out in the Appendix is from the Annual Report
of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court for 1971.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-161 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-162 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-163 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-177 (Reissue 1968).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-178 (Reissue 1968).
Cashen, Practice and Procedure Before Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court, 41 NEB. L. REV. 151, 160 (1961).
Spangler v. Terry Carpenter, Inc., 177 Neb. 740, 131 N.W.2d 159 (1964).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-179 (Supp. 1971).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-181 (Reissue 1968).
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is retried in a trial de novo, and at this juncture, a record of the
evidence and findings is made.40 If either party to a compensation
proceeding desires that the case be heard by the workmen's compensation court en banc, the right of a single party to be heard in
that court preempts the waiver of a rehearing in that court by
the opposing party 41 who has chosen, instead, an immediate appeal
to the district court by way of trial de novo. This right is paraexclusive of, the right to appeal directly to the
mount to, and
42
district court.

If the case does go to the workmen's compensation court en
bane, an appeal of a determination of that court must be taken, if
one is desired, to the district court.43 For the purposes of this
appeal, a transcribed copy of the testimony and evidence taken
before the compensation court en banc must be filed with the
district court. This transcript becomes the bill of exceptions upon
certificatiom4 4 The appeal from the compensation court en banc to
the district court is in the form of an error proceeding.4 5 The
district court, in this situation, must make its decision from the
record and from the oral arguments of counsel. The district court
can set aside or modify the findings of the compensation court en
banc only if it finds one of the following: (1) the court acted without or in excess of its powers; (2) the order or award was procured
by fraud; (3) the findings of fact of the court were not supported
by the record; or (4) the findings of fact by the court did not
support the order or award.46
The compensation act provides one procedure for appeal from
47
a judgment of the district court to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The state's highest court is statutorily limited to setting aside or
modifying a judgment of the district court only upon grounds
which resemble those by which the district court can modify or
set aside a judgment of the compensation court en bane. 4 8 Originally, the statute provided that:
40

NEB.

REV. STAT.

§ 48-181 (Reissue 1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-179

(Supp. 1971).
41 Light v. Nebraska Workmen's Comp. Court, 166 Neb. 540, 89 N.W.2d
833 (1958).
42 Skalak v. Seward Co., 174 Neb. 659, 119 N.W.2d 43 (1963).
43 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-182 (Supp. 1971).
44 Id.
45 NEs. Rav. STAT. § 48-184 (Reissue 1968).
46 Id.
47 NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1968).
48

Id.

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 4 (1972)

646

[A] judgment, order or award of the district court
modified or set aside only upon the following grounds:
the court acted without or in excess of its powers. (2)
judgment, order or award was procured by fraud. (3)

may be
(1) that
that the
that the

findings of fact are not conclusively supported by the evidence as
disclosed by the record, and if so found, the cause shall be considered de novo upon the record. (4) that the findings of fact by

the court do not support the order or award. 49

An appeal to the supreme court, like that to the district court,
is substantially in the form of an error proceeding since the grounds
upon which the supreme court can make modifications in the judgments of the lower courts are limited. There is, however, one
critically significant distinction between the appeal from the compensation court en banc to the district court and the final appeal
to the state supreme court. The district court, in an error proceeding, is limited to the record made in the compensation court en banc
and the oral arguments of counsel in making its determination. On
appeal from the district court, however, the supreme court had,
until recently, heard all compensation cases in the form of a trial
de novo upon the record. 50 Of this procedure the Nebraska Supreme
Court has stated that:
The appellant contends that an appeal to the district court after
a rehearing before the compensation court en banc, is in the nature
of an error proceeding, and the district court is without authority
in such a case to disturb questions of fact supported by evidence.
The previous holdings of this court support this contention. Solheim
v. Hastings Housing Co., 151 Neb. 264, 37 N.W.2d 212, and cases
therein cited. Even though the district court is so limited, an appeal
therefrom to this court is considered de novo upon the record.
Werner v. Nebraska Power Co., 149 Neb. 408, 31 N.W.2d 315. Under
such circumstances the manner in which the district court considered the case is of little concern. Whether or not the trial court
properly considered the controlling issues, the case is here de novo
for all practical purposes. While the situation is an anomalous one,
it has long been the rule.51
As the court tacitly stated, the mere fact that the present procedure
has long been employed in deciding workmen's compensation cases
in Nebraska does not present a compelling justification for perpetuating the use of those procedures.
The supreme court originally adopted the position that it had
to hear compensation cases de novo upon the record because the
legislature had provided that the judgments of the district courts
49

50

Neb Laws c. 57, § 13 (1935) (Emphasis added).
See, e.g., Murphy v. HiWay GMC Sales & Service Corp., 178 Neb.
397, 133 N.W.2d 595 (1965).

51 Miller v. Peterson, 165 Neb. 344, 346, 85 N.W.2d 700, 701 (1957).
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could be modified or set aside if "the findings of the fact [were]
not conclusively supported by the record. ' 52 The court concluded
for the first time in Werner v. Nebraska Power Co.5 3 that:
If upon review [of the evidence by trial de novo] we find the
award is conclusively supported by the evidence, that ends the
matter. If, however, as a result of a review of the evidence on a
trial de novo we find that the award should be sustained, it is not
necessary to determine the question as to whether the award is
"conclusively supported by the evidence." If we find as a result
of a trial de novo that the award should be modified or set aside,
then obviously it is not conclusively supported by the evidence. As
a practical proposition our review here is de novo upon the record.54

After the Werner decision the legislature amended section 48-185
of the Nebraska statutes by removing the word "conclusively" from
part (3) of that section. 55 Thus, the legislature directed the supreme
court to hear compensation cases de novo upon the record only
where the evidence did not support, as opposed to not conclusively
supporting, the findings of fact made by the lower courts. The
Nebraska Supreme Court, however, continued to hear compensation cases which had been appealed to it from a decision of the
district courts under the "conclusively supported" criterion which
had been a part of the original statute. 56 In June of 1971 the court
recognized the legislative changes in the grounds for modifying or
setting aside the judgments of the district courts. The court held
in a unanimous opinion written by Judge McCown in Gifford v. Ag
Lime, Sand & Grave 57 that:
We think it clear that a reasonable interpretation of section
48-185, R. R. S. 1943, as amended in 1953, is that the standards for
modifying or setting aside a judgment or award, and in measuring
the findings of fact by the trial court in a workmen's compensation
case, are to be the same whether the review is by the district court
or by this court. Appellate review in this court requires consideration and review of the record in all cases. That consideration
must ordinarily take account of the determination of the trial court
or jury as to the factual issues. This is particularly true in dealing
52
53
54
55
56

57

Neb. Laws c. 57, § 13 (1935).
149 Neb. 408, 31 N.W.2d 315 (1948).
Id. at 409, 31 N.W.2d at 316.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1968).
For an example of the kinds of things considered on de novo review
by the supreme court see Arlauskas v. Western Electric Co., 180 Neb.
790, 145 N.W.2d 925 (1966). There the supreme court found as a
matter of fact that: "Plaintiff looked like a man in severe shock with
profuse diaphoresis," and, "Plaintiff could distinguish only gross
objects and light, and his right eye appeared to be deviated externally." Id. at 791, 145 N.W.2d at 926.
187 Neb. 57, 187 N.W.2d 285 (1971).
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with appeals which are in the nature of actions at law. De Novo
review implies an independent determination of the facts without
restriction by any previous factual determinations made in the
lower court. While the distinction may be technical, it is nevertheless a vital one. Appellate courts do not ordinarily determine
factual issues de novo except when required by statute.
We therefore hold that on appeal of a workmen's compensation
case to the Supreme Court, if there is reasonable competent evidence to support the findings of fact in the trial court, the judgment, order, or award will not be modified or set aside for insufficiency of evidence. We also hold that upon appellate review of a
workmen's compensation case in the Supreme Court, the cause will
be considered de novo only where the findings of fact are not
supported by the evidence as disclosed by the record. To the
extent that the holding of Rapp v. Hale, 170 Neb. 620, 103 N.W.2d
851, and subsequent
cases on these issues are in conflict, they are
overruled.5 8

The Nebraska Supreme Court has now decided to review compensation cases de novo upon the record only where there is no "competent evidence" to support the findings of fact of the lower courts.
Though the nature of this change in the standard for review of
compensation cases is substantial, the impact which the change will
have in practice is unclear. Past usage of the phrase "competent
evidence" by the Nebraska court in compensation cases indicates
that the Gifford standard for review may signify nothing more than
a change in the lexicon of the court. 59 At any rate, it is probable
58

Id. at 63, 187 N.W.2d at 289.

59 See, e.g., Welke v. Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 503, 138 N.W.2d 808, 812-13

(1965), where the court stated: "In reaching this conclusion, we are
not unmindful of the fact that an award of compensation in a workmen's compensation case may not be based on possibility, probability,
As we said in .

or speculative evidence ....

.

. Schwabauer v. State,

147 Neb. 620, 24 N.W.2d 431: 'If a claimant has adduced competent
evidence having a probative value which preponderantly convinces
the trier or trier of fact .

.

. notwithstanding the trier of fact may

recognize a possibility or even a probability that this was not true,
an award of compensation thereon is proper and on appeal therefrom
must be sustained.'" (Emphasis added.) Welke indicates that "competent evidence" must preponderate in favor of a party or a judgment in that party's favor will be set aside on appeal. Assuming the
phrase "competent evidence" has the same meaning in Gifford as it
had in Welke, the Gifford standard for review of compensation cases
still requires the evidence to preponderate in favor of the party who
obtained judgment in the lower court or that judgment will be
modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court. To determine whether the
evidence properly preponderates to support the lower court's judgment, the supreme court must reweigh the evidence under the
Gifford standard just as it did before. Hence, Gifford appears to do
nothing more than set the old standard for review of compensation
cases in different terminology.

APPELLATE REVIEW
that some cases will be tried de novo by the supreme court in the
future. Clearly, according to both the mandate given the court by
the legislature 6 and the holding of the court in Gifford, compensation cases must be so tried if the supreme court finds that the
evidence supporting the findings of the lower courts is not reasonably competent.
Two workmen's compensation cases decided by the court since
it announced its decision in Gifford have made the significance of
Gifford in future compensation cases most difficult to foretell. In
Adler v. Jerryco Motors, Inc.61 the court waivered from its position
in Gifford when it held that "In a workmen's compensation proceeding a district court finding against a party will be set aside if
the evidence compels a finding for that party. When we set aside a
material finding because of the evidence we will consider the cause
'62
de novo.
Taken literally, it seems that the court in reaching its holding in
Adler reverted to its old practice of reviewing the evidence to
determine whether it "conclusively supports" the findings of fact
of the lower courts and substantially disregarded its holding in
Gifford. In Johnson v. Hahn Bros. Construction, Inc.6 3 decided just
two months after Adler, the court set out its holding in Gifford and
applied that holding strictly. After reciting the facts and reviewing
the Gifford decision, the court held in Johnson that:
The evidence without dispute supports a finding that Johnson
was on the work premises at the time of his injury; there is reasonable competent evidence to support a finding that at the time
of his injury he was in the act of reporting to the foreman for the
purpose of obtaining his work assignment. This brings him within
the ambit of the rules just stated.64
Past usage of the phrase "competent evidence" and inconsistent
application of the Gifford standard for appellate review have so
obfuscated the import of that holding that it is impossible to gauge
the significance that Gifford holds for future contested compensation cases. The Adler case, decided after Gifford, does make it clear
that de novo review of compensation cases remains possible in the
supreme court. For the reason that trial de novo upon the record
remains possible in the supreme court, it is inevitable that the
court will be called upon repeatedly to determine nothing more
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1968).
61 187 Neb. 757, 193 N.W.2d 757 (1972).
62 Id. at 760, 193 N.W.2d at 760.
63 188 Neb. 252, 196 N.W.2d 109 (1972).
64 Id. at 257, 196 N.W.2d at 113.
60
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than whether the evidence in particular cases is reasonably competent to support the determinations made by the lower courts on
issues of fact. Consequently, the change made by the Gifford case in
the standard for review of contested compensation cases, whatever
the extent of that change may be, is no panacea that will substantially lighten the case load of the supreme court. Despite Gifford,
parties to contested compensation cases will still face the possibility
of protracted litigation and will still be forced to bear the financial
burdens that have long accompanied appellate review of compensation cases. Certainly the change effected by Gifford has not and
will not result in abrupt realization of the aspirations of the provisions of the compensation act relating to appellate review.
V. A COMPARISON OF NEBRASKA'S COMPENSATION
PROCEDURE WITH THOSE OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The appellate procedure prescribed by the Nebraska workmen's
compensation act is clearly atypical.6 5 This is particularly true of
the procedure employed on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
In most jurisdictions in the United States, judicial review of awards
made by lower courts or administrative bodies in compensation
cases is confined solely to questions of law.6 6 In these jurisdictions
the evidence supporting the factual determinations made by the
lower bodies is not considered by the appellate courts,67 and the
findings of fact made by the lower courts are conclusive and irreversible if they are supported by any substantial evidence or any
reasonable interpretation thereof. 68 In many jurisdictions the appellate courts cannot modify or set aside the findings of fact made
by the lower courts6 9 even where they are convinced that the
weight of the evidence is contrary to those findings. 70 This is, of
course, not true in Nebraska where the findings of fact are redetermined by the appellate court in a trial de novo if they are not sup65

The general rule governing appellate review of workmen's compensation claims is succinctly stated in 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 80.00, at 244 (1970).

66 Id. § 80.10, at 246.
67 Id. § 80.20, at 264.
68

This position was taken by the Supreme Court in Cardillo v. Liberty

Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947).
69 See note 65 supra.
70

For an example of where a state supreme court was bound to the
findings of fact of the district court which were supported by the
medical testimony of one doctor and were contrary to the testimonies
of ten doctors see Richards v. J-M Service Co., 164 Kan. 316, 188
P.2d 939 (1948).
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ported by "reasonably competent" evidence. 7 ' The Nebraska rule
governing when and how extensively the findings of fact made by
the lower courts can be modified or set aside is much less stringent
than the majority rule. The uncommon nature of the Nebraska rule
and the uncompromising character of the majority rule are implicitly stated in Larson's treatise on workmen's compensation law
where it is observed that:
Except in a minority of jurisdictions that have adopted a different standard of review, the reviewing court will not ordinarily
weigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the
commission on findings of fact or choices between conflicting testimony or inferences, even when it is convinced that the weight of
evidence is contrary to the commission's findings.
The rule in its undiluted form requires that, when the particular finding is supported by credible evidence, it must be
affirmed when contrary, not only to the weight, but even to the
clear preponderance of the evidence.7 2
The majority rule governing appellate review of compensation
cases which allows judgments that are clearly against the preponderance of evidence to stand is harsh in its undiluted form.
The Nebraska procedure, however, appears to have even more undesirable consequences. In addition to injecting an additional,
superfluous and time-consuming step into the procedure for adjudicating compensation claims, the Nebraska procedure requires that

the supreme court spend a substantial quantity of its time perusing
highly technical facts just to determine whether those facts are
reasonably competent to support the findings of fact of the lower
courts.73 This procedure seems particularly wasteful when it is
observed that the lower courts in Nebraska, particularly the workmen's compensation courts, are specialized courts that function for
the essential purpose of making 74decisions in cases involving highly
complex and technical evidence.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has clearly expressed its desire
to have the legislature change the present procedure for review of
workmen's compensation cases. In a recent case the court specifically stated that "[i]t is desirable that the Legislature simplify
71
72
73

74

NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-185 (Reissue 1968).
See note 65 supra.
For examples of cases in which the Nebraska Supreme Court has had
to determine questions of a highly complex factual nature see Shoenrock v. School Dist. of Nebraska City, 179 Neb. 621, 139 N.W.2d 547
(1966), and Arlauskas v. Western Electric Co., 180 Neb. 790, 145
N.W.2d 925 (1966).
NEB. REV.STAT.§ 48-152 (Reissue 1968).
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practice and proceedings in these cases. 17 5 The Nebraska State
Bar Association, in accepting the reports of various committees, has
also gone on record on five separate occasions as being in favor of
prescribed by the Nebraska Workmen's
changes in the procedures
76
Compensation Act.
VI. PROPOSED CHANGES IN NEBRASKA'S WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PROCEDURE
The essential change in the procedure for supreme court review
of compensation cases in Nebraska should be three-fold: (1) a
procedure for direct appeal to the supreme court from the workmen's compensation court en banc should be provided; (2) the
findings of fact made by the lower courts should bear a presumption
of validity and should be disturbed only where supported by no
evidence or only by evidence received and/or relied on through
the commission of a material error of law; 77 (3) although the supreme court should be empowered to modify or set aside judgments
based on improper evidence, that court should not be able to redetermine the facts, i.e., it should not be allowed to conduct a trial
de novo upon the record. These are the three overt areas in which
the Nebraska procedure for appellate review of workmen's compensation cases could be substantially improved.
Alteration of the procedure for appellate review of compensation cases in the three areas described above would alleviate the
undesirable results which accrue from the system presently used
75 Marshall v. Columbus Steel Supply, 187 Neb. 102, 104, 187 N.W.2d
607, 609 (1971).
76 Expressions of the sentiments of the Nebraska State Bar Association
concerning the procedure for processing a compensation claim are
clearly delineated in the proceedings of the Bar Association conventions reported in Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Report of JudicialCouncil,
48 NEB. L. REV. 699 (1968); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Report of Committee on Procedure, 43 NEB. L. REv. 211 (1963); Nebraska State Bar
Ass'n, Report of Judicial Council, 42 NEB. L. REv., 343 (1962); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Report of Committee on Legislation, 41 NEB.
L. REv. 307 (1961); Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Report of Committee
on Legislation, 30 NEB. L. REv. 154 (1950).
77 See Appendix. The statistical records in this chart empirically demonstrate that the district courts and the workmen's compensation court
en banc come to very similar judgments upon review of compensation
cases. Although it does not necessarily follow from this similarity in
results, it would seem likely that these two courts possess nearly
equal levels of competence. Hence, this chart indicates that the current review procedure, which allows appellate review of a compensation case by both of these courts, is wastefully duplicative.
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in Nebraska and would also avoid the potential harshness of strict
compliance with the procedures employed by the majority of the
states to review findings of fact in compensation cases. The first
specific change needed is to delineate more narrow and more specific grounds for supreme court review of the findings of fact made
by the lower courts. Review of compensation cases by the Nebraska Supreme Court should be limited to questions of law. This
approach would not preclude the supreme court from modifying
any findings of fact made by the lower courts which were supported by no evidence or based upon mere speculation since such
findings constitute errors of law.7 s It should not be the duty of
the supreme court to determine questions of fact. Rather, the
court should be able to, and be required to, rely upon the determinations of fact arrived at by the lower courts without having to
reweigh the accuracy of those determinations in a trial de novo.
The competency of the lower courts should be respected. 79 It
should be made statutorily impossible for the supreme court to
reverse the factual determinations of the lower courts where those
decisions are supported by any evidence.8 0 Indeed, in states adhering closely to the majority rule, a statement of the inability of
the appellate courts to review the decisions of the lower courts
concerning issues of fact is "without any close competition, the
number one cliche of compensation law, and occurs in some form
in the first paragraph of compensation opinions almost as a matter
of course."81
Even under these tightened procedures, the supreme court would
be able to alter findings of fact which are grossly improper. It
78 Kastenek v. Wilding, 181 Neb. 348, 148 N.W.2d 201 (1967).
79 See note 77 supra. The records of the judgments of the lower courts and

the treatment of those judgments on review indicates that the lower
courts now deserve to be considered competent.
80 This limitation on supreme court review of findings of fact in compensation cases must be implemented in a manner consistent with
the Nebraska Constitution. The constitution provides that: "All courts
shall be open and every person, for any injury done him in his
lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course
of law, and justice administered without denial or delay." NEB. CoNsT.
art. I, § 13. This writer does not believe that such a limitation on
appellate review of findings of fact would contravene the constitution.
The effect of the change suggested would be to secure the findings
of the compensation court to the same extent that findings by juries
are secured from appellate review. Historically, at least, such a limitation is constitutionally valid.
81 3 A. LAPsoN, THE LAw OF WORKxmi's COMPENSATION § 80.10, at 245
(1970).
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could, for example, continue to set aside findings of fact and remand
cases where judgments are based upon a preponderance of possibilities because in Nebraska, conjecture, speculation or choice of
82
possibilities is not proof of a sufficient nature to establish a case.
To recover in workmen's compensation cases the claimants would
still be required to offer reasonable evidence to support their claims
in all of their indispensible elements. s3 Workmen's compensation
awards could still not "be sustained where the testimony gives rise
to conflicting inferences of equal degree of probability so that the
choice between them is mere conjecture. 8 4 And, as in the past,
under the proposed changes in the review of compensation cases
by the Nebraska Supreme Court, the rule of liberal construction of
the compensation act would apply only to questions of law and
would not apply to the evidence offered in support of a claim.8 5
These rules would always be construed consistently with the objectives of the compensation system.
Only by deletion of the possibility of trial de novo upon the
record in the supreme court can it ultimately be insured that
compensation claims can be adjudicated with the speed that the
legislature had hoped to secure when it enacted the original compensation statute in 1913.86 Elimination of the possibility of trial
82 The rule that a judgment based on speculation is erroneous as a
matter of law was settled in Raff v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb.,
181 Neb. 444, 149 N.W.2d 52 (1967).
83 Dike v. Betz, 181 Neb. 580, 149 N.W.2d 750 (1967), holds that an
injured workman must offer reasonable evidence to support his
claim in all of its indispensible elements or he cannot recover compensation.
84 Id.
This rule would mean, if the proposed changes are adopted, that
where a lower court finds that evidence gives rise to equal probabilities and the lower court gives judgment without a rational basis
(e.g., judgment for the plaintiff though, in such circumstances, he has
failed to prove his case by a preponderance of the evidence) the
appellate court could review the judgment. If the lower court finds
one of two nearly equal probabilities more compelling than the other
that finding could not be reviewed by the appellate court.
85 Prutt v. McMaken Transportation Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d 236
(1963).
86 The need to alter Nebraska's workmen's compensation system in the
areas suggested seems particularly acute when the current system is
examined in light of the recently enacted court-reform measures.
L.B. 1032, enacted by the 1972 session of the Unicameral, will significantly modernize and improve the county courts of this state. In
addition, L.B. 1032 amends NEB. REv. STAT. § 26-1,104 (Reissue 1964),
to streamline the method by which judgments of the county courts are
reviewed on appeal by the district courts. This court-reform statute
makes the procedures currently governing appellate review of compensation cases comparatively more antiquated than before.
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de novo from the procedure for review in the supreme court is the
only way to insure that that court will be forever removed from the
arena in which it has felt compelled to weigh the evidence in particularly troublesome compensation cases.8 7 No other procedural approach to supreme court review of compensation cases can insure
that the court will not be called upon to weigh highly technical
evidence in an effort to determine whether it will preponderate for
one party or for the other. This approach has proven successful in
other jurisdictions.85
As previously noted, in the majority of jurisdictions the "conclusive" evidence rule has been abandoned. In most of those jurisdictions the test now is whether the findings of fact arrived at by
the lower courts are supported by any "substantial" evidence.8 9 The
substantial evidence rule does not require that the evidence preponderate for one side.9 0 Indeed, if any substantial evidence can
be found anywhere in the record to support the findings of fact,
the appellate courts are bound to accept those findings91 although
the substantial evidence upon which they are based is clearly conThe problem of weighing the evidence has proven particularly troublesome for the Nebraska Supreme Court. In fact, some members of
the court have expressed what apparently constitutes their judgment
that where the evidence is conflicting and there is no ponderance,
the case cannot be decided or should not be decided, even in a trial
de novo. Judge Clinton, the newest member of the court, has written:
"What we are called upon to do is solely to judge the expertise of
the experts. When we have to do that alone there is no proof by
a preponderance of the evidence. Where as here the two specialists
testified by deposition, the judgment gets down to measuring the
length of the respective pedigrees." Conn v. ITL, Inc., 187 Neb. 112,
118, 187 N.W.2d 641, 644 (1971) (dissenting opinion).
Taken literally, this view would lead to the conclusion that because
the facts of particular cases are difficult, there is no remedy; the
case cannot be decided. Insofar as Judge Clinton may have meant
that in such cases the findings of the lower courts should be sustained, this writer agrees with Judge Clinton's analysis.
88 For a succinct tabulation of the procedures employed for judicial
review in the several states see 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WoRKmE's
87

COmPENSATION, Table 20, at 558-59 (1970).

89 L. HEADY, AimuVsTRATvE PRocEDuRE LEGISLATION

n m STATES, 107

(1952).
90 Id

91 K. DAVIS, ADnlNmsmAivE LAW § 29.02 (1958), defines the substantial
evidence rule in these terms: "In recent decades the principal guide

to the meaning of substantial evidence has been a Supreme Court
statement written by Chief Justice Hughes, [in Consolidated Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)]: 'Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.' A later
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trary to the preponderance of the evidence.92 Hence, the supporting evidence need not be substantial in the face of the evidence on
the opposing side, as has been argued, 93 but it must be prima facie
substantial. If the rule did require appellate courts to weigh evidence supporting conclusions of fact against opposing evidence it
would "as a practical matter . . . serve to tighten, and perhaps
even to overemphasize, judicial control over administrative action."9 4
It would seem that much of the controversy and confusion concerning the meaning of the substantial evidence rule could be
alleviated if more emphasis would be placed on the requirement
that reasonable evidence, which may be neither substantial nor
preponderate, must support the findings of fact. This approach
would more accurately depict the role of the appellate courts as
that of a body concerned with legal issues, not as a trier of fact.9 5
statement [in NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306

U.S. 292, 300 (1939)] clarifies further: Substantial evidence means

evidence which is substantial, that is affording a substantial basis
of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred....
[I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal
to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it
is one of fact for the jury.'"

L. HEADY, supra note 89, at 108.
93 Warren, The Federal Administrative Procedure Act and the Administrative Agencies, N.Y.U. SCHOOL OF LAW INSTruTE, 587 (1947).
94 L. HEADY, supra note 89, at 109.
92

95 Reviewing courts are appropriately considered adjudicators of questions of law and not triers of facts. This is demonstrated by the
Federal Employers Liability Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966), which provides: "To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning
or applicability of the terms of an agency action. The reviewing
court shall(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed; and
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be(A) arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or
immunity.
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to
sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed
on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute;
or
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To .this end, the effect of using the substantial evidence rule as
the standard for appellate review of workmen's compensation cases
should be to secure the findings of fact of the one-judge compensation courts from alteration by the appellate courts just as jury
determinations in other cases are binding upon the supreme court
of this state.
The fact-finding function in the workmen's compensation system
should be vested wholly in the workmen's compensation court,
which as a consequence of its hearing only compensation cases,
could rapidly acquire the expertise necessary to speedily adjudicate
compensation cases despite the presence of technical medical evidence. There is no reason to suspect that this approach would prove
less workable or otherwise less satisfactory than the current procedure. The results obtained from the altered system should prove
to be more desirable and the compensation procedure should be
more effective than it is currently. Indeed, the compensation procedures of the majority of the states, which are similar to those
proposed here,9 6 have proven to be productive and efficient.
It seems desirable that the findings of fact of the lower courts
be amenable to some judicial review where the evidence in
question is of a highly technical nature as it frequently is in compensation cases. The Nebraska statutes, as noted above, now provide that findings of fact are reviewable by two appellate bodies,
the district courts or the workmen's compensation court en banc97
and the supreme court. Assuming that the supreme court is precluded from reviewing findings of fact except for errors of law,
there would still be available to parties who are dissatisfied with
the findings and rulings which issue after the initial hearing of a
case, a procedure by which those findings of fact could be reviewed
by way of a trial de novo in a competent court of law.9 8 It would
be preferable, however, that this procedure for review be simplified by the Nebraska Legislature. 9 It seems redundant, for example,
to require a court of second instance to review without the benefit
of a record the factual determinations of the court with original
(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.
In making the foregoing determination, the court shall review the
whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account
shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error."
96 See note 65 supra.
97 NEB. Rsv. STAT. §§ 48-179 and 48-181 (Reissue- 1968).
98 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-179 and 48-181 (Reissue 1968)..
99 See Marshall v. Columbus Steel Supply, 187 Neb. 103, i04, 187 N.W.2d
607, 609 (1971); note 76, supra.
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jurisdiction. In terms of docket time, judicial effort and expense,
it is absurd to call, then recall witnesses; take, then retake depositions; and issue, then reissue subpoenaes. It should be required that
a record be made of the evidence adduced at the original hearing.
This record should then become the bill of exceptions upon being
certified by the presiding judge for all subsequent litigation of that
case. This procedure would avoid duplication of efforts and expenses which currently must be borne by both the judicial system
and the litigants.
There has not been any substantial expression of dissatisfaction
with the competence of the one-judge compensation courts and
their decisions. 0 0° If cause for such dissatisfaction exists, that cause
should be alleviated by improving the one-judge courts, not by
complicating the procedure for reviewing contested compensation
cases. Judicial interpretation of the Federal Employer's Liability
Act has successfully made the findings of fact of the administrative
agencies which administer the statute conclusive to the extent that
findings of fact cannot be subjected to review by any court (except
for review of errors of law upon which a factual determination
might rest).101 Hence, Nebraska could follow the model of the Federal Employer's Liability statute.
Appellate review of compensation cases could be simplified
even more completely if the statutory procedure for election by
the parties of the court to which they choose to appeal their cases
was eliminated. The workmen's compensation court en banc is
.surely as well qualified as a district court to review questions
pertaining to either the determinations of fact or the disposition
of the issues of law made by the one-judge workmen's compensation court. 0 2 The extraneous nature of the alternative procedure
provided by the current compensation act can readily be seen
100 See note 77 supra.
101 The Federal Employer's Liability Act was interpreted as limiting judicial review of findings of fact made by administrative agencies to
review for errors of law in Calderon v. Tobin, 187 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
102

See note 77 supra. There are clear indications in the statutes that the
district courts and the workmen's compensation court possess similar
levels of competence. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-153 (Reissue 1968), specifically provides that the district court judges and the judges of the
workmen's compensation court must possess the same qualifications
to hold their respective offices. The annual salary of the judges of
the compensation court is set at $25,000 by NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-159
(Supp. 1972). Before 1972 the district court judges were paid an
annual salary of $22,000, in that year their salary was raised to $27,500
by NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-301.01 (Supp. 1972).
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when one considers the similarity of the competence of the
two courts and the burdens imposed by providing two possible
appeals which an injured party must bear to receive compensation.
The infrequency of reversals by the district courts of the decisions
of the workmen's compensation court en banc seems to illustrate
103
that alternative methods of appeal are unnecessary.
Assuming the need to delete one of these appeal procedures
from the compensation act, the issue becomes which of the procedures for appeal should be eliminated to properly achieve the
objectives of the compensation system. To remain consistent with
the previously considered problems of lay determination of factual
questions involving highly technical evidence, it would seem logical to choose to eliminate the district courts from the Nebraska
procedure. It is argued by some, however, that it is necessary to
retain in the compensation system, at a level inferior to that of
the state supreme court, a purely judicial process for the adjudication of compensation claims. In Kansas, where the district courts
have the final review of all questions of fact, the Kansas Supreme
Court has observed that:
The final responsibility for reaching proper findings of fact in
workmen's compensation cases, as in many others, rests upon the
district courts. Such courts, from examination of the transcripts,
should carefully consider the weight and preponderance of the
conflicting medical and other evidence, the reflected ability and
integrity of witnesses, and reach results which will cast credit
upon the impartiality and rectitude of judicial tribunals because
this court cannot consider such elements in an effort to perpetuate the high respect and esteem for courts which should follow
from the exercise of the responsibility.1 04
There is certainly merit in the argument that a court below
the state supreme court, one with a view to the totality of the
processes of the law and their impact on the society, should make
the ultimate determination on issues of fact involving difficult
equities between adverse parties. However, the long established
legislative policy of providing speedy decisions, the highly complex
nature of the evidence frequently involved, and the extensive
nature of our technological society opt for the conclusion that the
area of workmen's compensation can best be served by allowing
a specialized court 0 5 to service it in all cases involving disputes of
.03

104
1O5

See note 73 supra.
Richards v. J-MVt Service Co., 164 Kan. 316, 188 P.2d 939 (1948).
It should be noted that Nebraska is the only state that has a special
court to hear compensation cases. All the other states operate their
compensation systems through commissions or without either a special

660

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 51, NO. 4 (1972)

fact. Workmen's compensation is, after all, a specialized area of
law. It functions by virtue of the existence of a statute passed
specifically to create and govern its administration.' 6 In addition
to being well situated to review the facts in compensation cases
and, if necessary, to retry them, the specialized function of the
compensation court makes it as capable of lending the air of serious
judicial rectitude to the adjudication of such cases as are courts
of general jurisdiction. In fulfilling its function as the arbiter of
controverted compensation claims, the compensation court should
develop a capacity for comprehending the equities in the cases
brought before it which would enhance the court's effectiveness.
This expertise will assist the compensation court in fulfilling its
legislative mandate which requires that it impartially and efficiently
administer the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Act. 0

T

A court

of general jurisdiction cannot develop this skill because it must
remain more adaptive than the compensation court; such a court
does not exist to oversee the administration of any particular area
of the law. The district courts in Nebraska should, therefore, be
excluded from the Workmen's Compensation system as appellate
bodies. 0 8 They should review neither judgments of law nor findings
of fact in compensation cases.
commission or court to oversee the administration of workmen's compensation. Oklahoma has a State Industrial Court that administers its
compensation system but that body is, in fact, more kin to a commission than a court.
106 NEB. REV. STAT.

§ 48-101 (Reissue 196a).

107 Id.

10s It has been argued that total elimination of the district courts from
the appellate proceedings provided by the compensation statute would
be unnecessary to secure speedy appellate review of compensation
cases. The alternative to total exclusion of the district courts from
review of compensation cases would be to provide a direct appeal from
the Workmen's Compensation Court en banc to the supreme court, as
well as an appeal to the supreme court from the district court. The
effect of this kind of a compromise between the status quo and the
changes proposed by this writer would be to allow any one party to
take the case to the compensation court en banc and then to appeal,
with the consent of the other party to waive review by the district
court, directly to the supreme court. To the extent that this solution
would streamline appellate review of contested compensation cases
where both parties could agree to forego review by the district courts,
it represents an improvement in the appellate procedure. It seems to
this writer, however, that such a solution would leave an unwarranted
step, i.e., possible review by the district courts, in the statute that
could continue to delay the compensation process in contested cases.
Judge Ben Novicoff, the presiding judge of the Nebraska Workmen's
Compensation Court, submitted the following proposed statute to the
Judicial Council of the Nebraska State Bar Association in 1968. This
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court en bane should
possess the conclusive power to review findings of fact made by
one-judge compensation courts in compensation cases. The findings
of the one-judge courts should be reviewed de novo upon a record
made by the one-judge courts; review of these findings should be
subjected to the substantial evidence rule. The evidence should
generally preponderate in favor of the party to whom judgment is
awarded, but merely the quantity of the evidence presented on
each of the respective sides in a case should not be determinative.
The findings made or approved by the compensation court en bane
should be subject to review by the state supreme court only for
errors of law. If such an error is found, the case should be remanded to the workmen's compensation court en banc. The Nebraska Supreme Court should never retry compensation cases on
the record of the lower court. 109
David A. Domina '73
statute, if enacted, would effect a compromise between total elimination of the district courts from the appellate process in contested
compensation cases and the role currently played by the district courts
in that process. (References are to the Nebraska Revised Statutes.)
§ 48-182. Repeal in its entirety.
§ 48-183. Repeal in its entirety.
§ 48-184. Repeal in its entirety.
§ 48-185. Appeal to Supreme Coiirt; time for taking appeal;
grounds for reversal. Any appeal from the judgment of the district
court or from the compensation court after a rehearingshall be prosecuted in accordance with the general laws of the state regulating
appeals in action at law. Such appeal shall be perfected within one
month from the rendition of judgment by the district court--or compensation court after rehearing,the cause shall be advanced for argument before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court shall render
its judgment and write an opinion in such cases as speedily as possible.
The ftndings of fact made by the district court or compensation court
after rehearing acting within its powers shall, in the absence of fraud,
be conclusive. A judgment, order, or award of the district court or
compensation court after rehearing may be modified or set aside only
upon the grounds that (1) the court acted without or in excess of its
powers, (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud,
(3) the findings of fact are not supported by any evidence as disclosed by the record, or (4) the findings of fact by the court do not
support the order or award.
109 During printing, the court in Klein v. TrinitiesIndus. Inc., 189 Neb. 117,
-N.W.2d-(1972), further obscured the standard on review. Judge
Smith (concurring) alludes to the problems discussed above.
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APPENDIX
SUMMARY OF REHEARINGS AND APPEALS FOR
THE FISCAL YEAR 1970-1971

a)-,,

-

0,

U

M co

LO

nO

t:-

00

0

Co

00
U

CO C

111", 1,1*1
11C-q1
112,

V)

co

CD -4
-4

00u.
0

V~

0

oh

I'd'

cn Co

C11

Q0

Ic.~

a) .0- 0.

CD cc

0

0-

~

-4

~4

co CD

'11441"1 1-1 11--11110

U)

0R Cq

U~b

r 0 a)
0

002

CD

1-i

C11

I'IL Jq

Icjo
01
'-4
0.

0o

C

.9
.$U

toa

w-a
0 +0

0

a
0
bba)

>ae CU

.

co.

co

* Each number in parenthesis is the standard deviation associated with

the lag above it.

** Numbers in these columns represent calendar days.

